IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

ALAA E. NOEMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:20-cv-2656-MSN-tmp

TOWN OF MASON,
EMMIT GOODEN,
CHRISTOPHER PATE,
MASON BOARD OF ALDERMEN,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") (ECF No. 27) filed November 17, 2021. After the Court granted an extension, Plaintiff filed his Response on January 4, 2022 (ECF No. 30). Defendants filed their Reply in support on January 18, 2022 (ECF No. 31.) For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is **GRANTED**.

BACKGROUND

In support of their Motion, Defendants filed a Statement of Material Facts Upon Which Defendants Rely in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' SMF") (ECF No. 27-30).

Consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56,[1] Local Rule 56.1(b) of this Court provides, in pertinent part:

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[1] "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for

> Any party opposing the motion for summary judgment must respond to each fact set forth by the movant by either: (1) agreeing that the fact is undisputed; (2) agreeing that the fact is undisputed for the purpose of ruling on the motion for summary judgment only; or (3) demonstrating that the fact is disputed. Each disputed fact must be supported by specific citation to the record. Such response shall be filed with any memorandum in response to the motion. The response must be made on the document provided by the movant or on another document in which the non-movant has reproduced the facts and citations verbatim as set forth by the movant . . . . A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a response within 28 days after the motion is served . . . ."

Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants' SMF. In analogous contexts, this Court has deemed the movants' facts undisputed for summary judgment purposes. *See*, *e.g.*, *Melton v. Bank of Lexington*, No. 02-1152, 2007 WL 9706435, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. June 15, 2007) (internal citations omitted); *Blount v. D. Canale Beverages*, No. 02-2183, 2003 WL 23412034, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 12, 2003). *See also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).[2] Because Plaintiff has not complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and Local Rule 56.1, the facts in Defendants' SMF are deemed admitted and undisputed for summary judgment purposes.

Additionally, in support of his Response in opposition to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff filed a Statement of Material Facts Upon Which Plaintiff Relies in Support of His Response to Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's SMF") (ECF No. 30-2).

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purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

[2] "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may: . . . (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials – including the facts considered undisputed – show that the movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Local Rule 56.1(b) provides, in pertinent part as follows:

> In addition, the non-movant's response may contain a concise statement of any additional facts that the non-movant contends are material *and as to which the non-movant contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried*. Each such disputed fact shall be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph with specific citations to the record supporting the contention that such fact is in dispute.

Plaintiff's statement of additional facts does not contain citations supporting that such facts are disputed. Instead, Plaintiff's SMF contains citations and materials supporting the veracity of each fact. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Local Rules contemplate the nonmovant's filing of a statement of undisputed facts, such as that submitted by Plaintiff. The Court therefore disregards this filing for purposes of deciding the Motion. Accordingly, the facts set forth below are undisputed for purposes of summary judgment.

Plaintiff is a resident citizen of the Defendant Town of Mason, Tennessee ("Defendant Town") and serves as an alderman and a member of the Board of Mayor and Alderman for Defendant Town. (ECF No. 27-30 at PageID 358.) Defendant Emmit Gooden ("Defendant Gooden") is Mayor of Defendant Town and is sued in his official capacity. (*Id.* at PageID 359.) Defendant Christopher Pate was the Planner for Defendant Town at all times relevant to Plaintiff's claims and is sued in his official capacity. (*Id.*)

This matter centers around a parcel of commercial property located at 578 Highway 70, Mason, Tennessee, which is owned by Plaintiff ("Property"). (*Id.* at PageID 359.) According to Plaintiff's Complaint, he sought to open a trucking school at the Property, but his application for a business license to do so was denied. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 5–7.) As alleged in the Complaint, Defendant Pate required Plaintiff to obtain a survey of the Property to confirm it was not in a "special flood area." (*Id.*) Plaintiff alleges a survey is not necessary for the Property because he does not want to make improvements to the property that equal or exceed 50 percent of the Property's value. (*Id.* at PageID 6–7.) Plaintiff alleges the denial of his business license and

Defendant Pate requiring Plaintiff to obtain a survey were the result of a political quarrel. (*Id.* at PageID 5 & 7.) Plaintiff further alleges he is "being discriminated against" because "other members of the community are operating businesses without a license in areas not zoned for commercial use." (*Id.* at PageID 8.) Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff's Complaint contains the following four headings for his causes of action: Count I Violation of Constitutional Rights; Count II Economic Losses; Count III Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and Count IV Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (*Id.* at PageID 7–10.)

During discovery, Plaintiff failed to come forward with the application he submitted in 2019 or 2020 for a business license to operate a trucking school, and Defendant Town has no record that Plaintiff submitted applications for such a business license in that time period. (ECF No. 27-30 at PageID 360.) Instead, what appears to be at issue are applications for a Certificate of Occupancy for the Property submitted by Plaintiff on May 16, 2019 ("2019 COO Application") and March 6, 2020 ("2020 COO Application"). (*Id.* at PageID 361–62; *see also* ECF No. 27-5 at PageID 253–55.) It was in response to the 2019 and 2020 COO Applications that Defendant Pate recommended to the Defendant Town's Code Compliance Officer, "Building Inspector," that a survey of the Property be performed to determine if it was located in a "special flood hazard" area. (*See* ECF No. 27-5 at PageID 253–55; ECF No. 27-8 at PageID 263; ECF No. 27-12 at PageID 277.) Defendant Town's Building Inspector administers and enforces the provisions of Defendant Town's zoning ordinances; Defendant Pate does not have authority to make decisions, only to make recommendations. (ECF No. 27-5 at PageID 253.) In a memorandum prepared by Defendant Pate as to the 2020 COO Application, Plaintiff was advised that if the Building Inspector ordered a survey based on Defendant Pate's recommendation, Plaintiff could appeal that decision to the Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA"). (ECF No. 27-5 at PageID 254; ECF No. 27-

12 at PageID 277.) Plaintiff never appealed to the BZA as to either the 2019 COO Application or the 2020 COO Application. (ECF No. 27-30 at PageID 363.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits a party to move for summary judgment — and the Court to grant summary judgment — "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting the presence or absence of genuine issues of material facts must support its position either by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," including depositions, documents, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, or other materials, or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); *Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis, Inc.*, 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party may discharge this burden either by producing evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or simply "by 'showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." *Id.* at 325. Where the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot "rest upon its . . . pleadings, but

rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." *Moldowan v. City of Warren*, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing *Matsushita*, 475 U.S. at 586; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56). The nonmoving party must present sufficient probative evidence supporting its claim that disputes over material facts remain and must be resolved by a judge or jury at trial. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248–49 (citing *First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co.*, 391 U.S. 253 (1968)); *see also White v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc.*, 617 F.3d 472, 475–76 (6th Cir. 2010). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough; there must be evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party. *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 252; *Moldowan*, 578 F.3d at 374.

The Court's role is limited to determining whether there is a genuine dispute about a material fact, that is, if the evidence in the case "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248. Such a determination requires that the Court "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden" applicable to the case. *Id.* at 254. Thus, if the plaintiff must ultimately prove its case at trial by a preponderance of the evidence, on a motion for summary judgment the Court must determine whether a jury could reasonably find that the plaintiff's factual contentions are true by a preponderance of the evidence. *See id.* at 252–53.

Finally, if the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with respect to which it has the burden of proof, the movant is entitled to summary judgment. *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 323. The Court must construe Rule 56 with due regard not only for the rights of those "asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury," but also for the rights of those "opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis." *Id.* at 327.

DISCUSSION

To begin, it is a bit difficult to organize the discussion on the Motion due to differences in how Plaintiff's claims are presented in the Complaint versus Defendants' Motion.[3] As discussed above, Plaintiff's Complaint uses headings and appears to assert the following four causes of action: (1) Count I Violation of Constitutional Rights; (2) Count II Economic Losses; (3) Count III Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (4) Count IV Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts these causes against Defendant Town, and Defendant Gooden and Defendant Pate, in their official capacities. In their Motion, Defendants categorize Plaintiff's claims as follows: (A) official-capacity claims; (B) denial of business license claim; (C) 2019 application for certificate of occupancy; (D) Section 1983 procedural due process claim; (E) "political quarrel" claim; (F) Section 1983 claim for the recommended survey; (G) claim that Plaintiff was singled out in being asked to provide a survey; and (H) Plaintiff's state law claims. The reason for some of these organizational differences, such as Defendants' arguments as to the official-capacity claims, are easy to understand. However, Defendants' separate arguments as to things such as Plaintiff's "political quarrel" claim and Plaintiff's claim that he was singled out in being asked to provide a survey, are unusual because it is not clear to the Court that Plaintiff asserted these as separate cognizable causes of action. In any event, Plaintiff's response to the Motion focuses on a single claim under § 1983 for denial of the right to earn a living. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff asserted cognizable claims in his Complaint for (B) the denial of a business license, (E) a "political quarrel" and public records request retaliation, or (G) being singled out by being asked to provide a survey, his failure to respond to Defendants' arguments on those claims

[3] The Court recognizes parties may use headings without intending to limit claims or arguments, but they nonetheless serve as useful guideposts.

means that Plaintiff has abandoned them. *See, e.g.*, *Brown v. VHS of Mich., Inc.*, 545 F. App'x 368, 372 (6th Cir. 2013) ("[A] plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment."); *Clark v. City of Dublin*, 178 F. App'x 522, 524–25 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the failure to respond to arguments in motion for summary judgment constitutes abandonment of claim). When a plaintiff abandons such claims, "district courts in this Circuit grant summary judgment as a matter of course." *Alexander v. Carter for Byrd*, 733 F. App'x 256, 261 (6th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, Defendants' Motion is **GRANTED** as to Plaintiff's abandoned claims. The remaining claims are addressed below using Plaintiff's organizational framework with Defendants' categorization of the claims cross-referenced in the discussion.

A. Plaintiff's "Count I Violation of Constitutional Rights"

In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts in "Count I Violation of Constitutional Rights" that "his Constitutional Rights have been violated by denying him his Due Process rights and his right to pursue his business resulting from a political quarrel." (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 7.) Plaintiff does not reference § 1983 in this count, and he expressly included a separate count as to § 1983 as "Count IV." To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert direct constitutional claims against Defendants, those claims fail because § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for such constitutional violations. *See, e.g.*, *Foster v. Mich.*, 573 F. App'x 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2014) ("To the extent Appellants attempt to assert direct constitutional claims, they fail; we have long held that § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for constitutional violations."). Thus, as to any direct constitutional claims against Defendants in the Complaint, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on those claims.

B. Plaintiff's "Count II Economic Losses"

In Plaintiff's "Count II Economic Losses," Plaintiff alleges that in addition to the violations of his Constitutional Rights, he has "suffered economic losses" because of Defendants' actions. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 9.) "Economic losses" may describe the nature of Plaintiff's damages, but they are not a separate cause of action. Even though Plaintiff included this as a heading and separate "count," there is no cognizable legal claim for "economic losses" that is separate and distinct from Plaintiff's other specified causes of action.

C. Plaintiff's "Count IV Violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983"[4]

Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides:

> Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

Section 1983 is not the source of any substantive right, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the "Constitution and laws" of the United States (2) committed by a defendant acting under color of state law. *Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

[4] The Court addresses Count IV before Count III, as Count IV contains the only federal law claims.

1. Official-Capacity Claims

First, Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's official-capacity § 1983 claims. Defendants argue that because Plaintiff has also asserted a claim against Defendant Town, these official-capacity claims are duplicative. This Court agrees.

Official-capacity suits "'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.' As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." *Kentucky v. Graham*, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (quoting *Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). As a result, when a plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim against a municipal entity and a municipal official in his or her official capacity, federal courts will dismiss the official-capacity claim. *Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., Tenn. By & Through Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming district court's dismissal of official-capacity suits).

Because Plaintiff has sued Defendant Town in addition to Defendants Gooden and Pate in their official capacities, the claims against Defendants Gooden and Pate in their official capacities are duplicative. Defendants Gooden and Pate are thus entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against them, and their Motion is **GRANTED** as to those claims.[5]

2. Municipal Liability

Plaintiff's § 1983 claims are based on Defendant Pate's recommendations to the Building Inspector that Plaintiff obtain a survey of the Property to confirm whether it was in a special flood hazard zone. Defendant Pate made the survey recommendation first as to Plaintiff's 2019 COO

[5] Plaintiff's Response failed to address Defendants' arguments as to the official-capacity claims. Plaintiff has therefore abandoned them, and this is another basis for granting summary judgment on these claims. *See, e.g.*, *Brown*, 545 F. App'x at 372; *Alexander*, 733 F. App'x at 261.

Application, and again, after Plaintiff submitted his 2020 COO Application. (*See* ECF No. 27-5 at PageID 253–55; ECF No. 30-1 at PageID 372.) Plaintiff's Response claims that he "has presented proof that an agent of [Defendant] Town ([Defendant] Pate) violated his constitutional rights with respect to the use of his property." (ECF No. 30-1 at PageID 372.) Even assuming this is true, it is not sufficient to impose liability on Defendant Town under § 1983 because a municipality "may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." *Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York*, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); *see McGuire v. City of Sweetwater, Tenn.*, No. 20-6067, 2021 WL 3620449, at *4 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2021).

To impose liability on Defendant Town, Plaintiff must show his injuries were sustained pursuant to an illegal custom or policy. *See Monell*, 436 U.S. at 691–92. "A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision-making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations." *Burgess v. Fischer*, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013); *see Thomas v. City of Chattanooga*, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2005); *Wallace v. Coffee Cnty.*, 852 F. App'x 871, 876 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing *Doe v. Claiborne Cnty.*, 103 F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996)). Here, nothing in the record of this matter supports that any injury to Plaintiff was the result of an illegal custom or policy.

First, Plaintiff does not identify or describe any official policy or legislative enactment that he contends was the moving force behind Defendant Pate's alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Second, there is no evidence that Defendant Pate is a policymaking official. "Although it is true that final policymaking authority may be delegated . . . mere authority to exercise discretion while performing particular functions does not make a municipal employee a

final policymaker unless the official's decisions are final and unreviewable and are not constrained by the official policies of superior officials." *Miller v. Calhoun Cnty.*, 408 F.3d 803, 814 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (citing *Feliciano v. City of Cleveland*, 988 F.2d 649, 655 (6th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiff has made no allegations, nor offered any testimony or other evidence in the record, to demonstrate that Defendant Pate had final, unreviewable discretion unconstrained by the official policies of superior officials. And Defendants have provided evidence that Defendant Pate's decisions could be adopted or rejected by the Building Inspector, and further, any decision by the Building Inspector was appealable to the Board of Zoning Appeals. Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence that a policymaker with final decision-making authority ratified Defendant Pate's allegedly unconstitutional actions.

Plaintiff also fails to make a showing to support his claims under the third or fourth theory of municipal liability. A claim of inadequate training or supervision requires a plaintiff to show "prior instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [municipality] ha[d] ignored a history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to cause injury." *Burgess*, 735 F.3d at 478 (citing *Miller v. Sanilac Cnty.*, 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010)). Similarly, for a custom of tolerance or acquiescence claim, a plaintiff must show that there was a persistent pattern of illegal activity of which the defendant had notice or constructive notice. *See Wallace*, 852 F. App'x at 876. Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence of a pattern for either theory.

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing to support any theory of municipal liability for Defendant Town under § 1983 for the alleged constitutional violations. Thus, Defendants' Motion is **GRANTED** as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims. To clarify, this applies to the § 1983 claim as set forth Count IV of the Complaint and argued as a denial of the right to

earn a living in Plaintiff's Response, both as to the 2019 COO Application and the 2020 COO Application, and as organized in Defendant's Motion: the (C) claim related to the 2019 COO Application, (D) Section 1983 Procedural Due Process Claim, and (F) Section 1983 claim for the recommended survey.[6]

D. Plaintiff's "Count III Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress"

Where "all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims." *Booker v. City of Beachwood*, 451 F. App'x 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp.*, 89 F.3d 1244, 1254–55 (6th Cir. 1996)). "[A] federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff's federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff's state-law claims." *Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply*, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006). The Court has determined that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for Plaintiff's federal law claims. Ordinarily, this Court would follow the "usual Sixth Circuit practice" and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, codified as Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101 *et seq.* *See Crehan v. Davis*, 713 F. Supp. 2d 688, 701 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (citing *Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply*, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)). However, Plaintiff failed to respond to the arguments in Defendants' Motion as to his state law claim. Plaintiff's failure to respond to Defendant's arguments means that Plaintiff has abandoned this claim, and therefore, Defendants' Motion is **GRANTED** as to Plaintiff's claim

[6] The Court also notes that Plaintiff's Response failed to address Defendants' arguments as to (C) Plaintiff's claim for the 2019 COO Application being time-barred, and (D) Plaintiff's procedural due process claim failing because he did not seek review from the Board of Zoning Appeals. Plaintiff has therefore abandoned those claims, and again, this is another basis for granting summary judgment. *See, e.g.*, *Brown*, 545 F. App'x at 372; *Alexander*, 733 F. App'x at 261.

for intentional infliction of emotional distress. *See, e.g.*, *Brown*, 545 F. App'x at 372; *Alexander*, 733 F. App'x at 261.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is **GRANTED**.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of March, 2022.

s/ Mark S. Norris
MARK S. NORRIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE